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INTRODUCTION
Consumers in the United States are flocking to local food. The
number of farmers’ markets around the country—many of which purport
to sell only locally grown produce—has rapidly grown in recent years.1
The allure of producers’ markets2 is easy to understand. Locavores3
*
B.A., Yale University (2003); J.D., Yale Law School (2007); Assistant Professor,
Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks to Nicholas Lee, Courtney Turner,
Rebecca Vermette, and the Regent Law Review staff for doing a terrific job organizing this
symposium.
1
LYDIA OBERHOLTZER & SHELLY GROW, PRODUCER-ONLY FARMERS’ MARKETS IN
THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION: A SURVEY OF MARKET MANAGERS 2 (2003).
2
Id. at 3 (noting that the term “producer-only” market is relatively recent and
defining it as meaning that vendors “produce the goods that they sell directly to retail
customers”).
3
A locavore is defined as “a person whose diet consists only or principally of locally
grown or produced food.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1025 (Angus Stevenson &
Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010); see also Stephanie Tai, The Rise of U.S. Food
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prefer small farms to massive, distant agribusiness for freshness,
environmental, social, and safety-based reasons, and they assume, when
so assured by the market, that the food at the market is in fact local.
Beyond the health and safety benefits that some consumers believe flow
from knowledge of food production practices, 4 buyers enjoy the quality
and taste of just-picked produce,5 and they derive substantial utility
from the knowledge that they have supported local agriculture. 6 Many
also believe that fresh, local produce is healthier and less
environmentally damaging.7 Producers are equally pleased by the trend
toward local food and farmers’ markets—local food often sells at a
premium,8 and direct sales to consumers reduce packaging and
marketing costs,9 an important consideration for small producers.
Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1074–1080 (2012) (describing the
“modern sustainable food movement”).
4
Shermain D. Hardesty, Role of Direct Marketing in California, 10 AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 5 (noting consumers’ “sense of food safety”
associated with local produce comes from their familiarity with the source); see also RICH
PIROG & ANDY LARSON, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAFETY, HEALTH, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VARIOUS SCALES AND GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN OF FOOD SUPPLY
CHAINS 2, 10 (2007) (concluding, from a survey that produced 500 usable responses, that
“[e]ighty-five percent indicated that local produce was ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ safe, with 74
percent indicating they perceived the national food supply chain to be safe.”).
5
KIM DARBY ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LOCALLY PRODUCED FOODS: A
CUSTOMER INTERCEPT STUDY OF DIRECT MARKET AND GROCERY STORE SHOPPERS 6, 10
(2006) (finding, based on a survey of 530 consumers, that “[f]reshness was the most
frequently cited” reason for buying local produce and that “[t]aste also ranked high”);
Kynda R. Curtis, Are All Direct Market Consumers Created Equal?, 42 J. FOOD
DISTRIBUTION RES. 26, 28, (2011), (showing “taste” as the most important produce attribute
cited by community supported agriculture (“CSA”) and farmers’ market customers);
Hardesty, supra note 4, at 5 (“Consumers have reported that quality is the number one
reason they shop at farmers’ markets; they are attracted by the fresh-picked, and vine- and
tree-ripened produce.”).
6
Kim Darby et al., Decomposing Local: A Conjoint Analysis of Locally Produced
Foods, 90 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 476, 485 (2008).
7
See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 5, at 26–28, 31 (noting that although both farmers’
market and CSA customers “rated product taste as the most important attribute” they
sought in produce, CSA customers also cared about whether the produce was “organic,”
high “quality,” and “local”—more so than farmers’ market customers).
8
See, e.g., DARBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (concluding that “consumers are
willing to pay more for locally produced foods”); see also OBERHOLTZER & GROW, supra note
1, at 2 (citing TIM PAYNE, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., U.S. FARMERS MARKETS—2000: A STUDY
OF EMERGING TRENDS, at iv (2002) (describing broad economic benefits to farmers, and
noting that, in 2000, more than 19,000 farmers “exclusively” sold their produce at farmers’
markets)). But see JAKE CLARO, VERMONT FARMERS’ MARKETS AND GROCERY STORES: A
PRICE COMPARISON 23 (2011) (finding that “prices at farmers’ markets are in many cases
competitive with prices at grocery stores”); RICH PIROG & NICK MCCANN, IS LOCAL FOOD
MORE EXPENSIVE? A CONSUMER PRICE PERSPECTIVE ON LOCAL AND NON-LOCAL FOODS
PURCHASED IN IOWA 7–11 (2009) (comparing local and non-local prices for zucchini,
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Consumer demand for localism, with the price premiums that
follow, creates an incentive for fraud—passing off non-locally-produced
food as farm-raised.10 It is difficult for both consumers and market
managers to distinguish between a carrot grown at the farm down the
road and a carrot plucked from the shelves of a chain grocery store and
resold on market day.11 The threat of farmers’ market fraud is not
merely theoretical. Investigations by a news station in California
uncovered numerous incidents of farmers selling produce that they had
not grown.12 Market managers around the country have similarly found
farmers selling purportedly local food out of season 13 and, when visiting
farms, have observed piles of dirt rather than crops.14 Although the
extent of the fraud is not currently known—and the great majority of
sellers are very likely honest—the number and variety of incidents so far
suggests that it could be fairly widespread. Farmers’ markets will likely
continue to grow,15 and as demand for local produce increases, 16 the
summer squash, cucumbers, string beans, cabbage, sweet onions, tomatoes, corn, eggs, and
certain meats and noting that in terms of statistical significance only string beans were
more expensive at farmers’ markets).
9
See, e.g., Nina W. Tarr, Food Entrepreneurs and Food Safety Regulation, 7 J.
FOOD L. & POL’Y 35, 36, 46–47 (2011) (noting that if a “farmer had bagged . . . lettuce before
taking it to market, she would have engaged in ‘processing’ ” and would have been “subject
to more regulation,” but also noting that even farmers who sell raw produce at markets
already must comply with a variety of safety-related regulations, although this varies by
state).
10 For examples, see infra Part II.
11 As shown by recent scandals relating to mislabeled fish and olive oil, this
problem is not confined to farmers’ markets. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Survey Finds That
Fish Are Often Not What Label Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/us/survey-finds-that-fish-are-often-not-what-labelsays.html?_r=0; Elizabeth Weise, Study: Imported Extra Virgin Olive Oil Often Mislabeled,
USA TODAY, (July 16, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
industries/food/2010-07-15-Oliveoil15_ST_N.htm?csp=34.
12 Joel Grover & Matt Goldberg, False Claims, Lies Caught on Tape at Farmers
Markets, NBC L.A. (Sept. 23, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/
Hidden-Camera-Investigation-Farmers-Markets-103577594.html.
13 See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
14 See infra text accompanying note 58.
15 In addition to the benefits to consumers, producers, and communities, the Food
Safety Modernization Act also might encourage more direct sales to consumers as, under
the Act, farmers are exempt from certain stricter food safety standards if they can show
that during a three-year period they had a higher “average annual monetary value of the
food . . . sold directly to qualified end-users” than the average annual monetary value of all
“food manufactured, processed, packed, or held” at the facility and “the average annual
monetary value of all food sold by such facility” during the three-year period was less than
$500,000. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103, § 418(l)(1)(C)(ii), Pub. L. No. 111353, 124 Stat. 3892 (2011) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350g(l)(1)(C)(ii) (2012))
(emphasis added).
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problem may become more acute. If so, it could undermine legitimate
local food sellers through direct competition as well as by threatening
consumer confidence in producer-only markets as a whole.17
Public and private responses to the problem vary. Current market
and government anti-fraud efforts range from the non-existent to the
highly involved, but even careful attempts to ensure the produce is truly
local sometimes fail. Farm visits, a measure commonly included in
market rules,18 can only verify produce that is growing at the time of the
visit, and in some cases not even that—produce stored on site and
observed by the market manager was not necessarily produced on site. 19
Programs that rely on farmer self-certification, including descriptions
and maps of crops, can be gamed, particularly in larger markets where
peer monitoring is less likely to be effective. And although state
regulatory or criminal penalties can be significant, the few states that
have attempted to implement a relatively comprehensive anti-fraud
regulatory regime at markets lack the resources to fairly and
consistently enforce these rules. 20
To ensure that consumers get what they think they are buying, and
to protect honest producers’ businesses, more effective efforts to curb
farmers’ market fraud may be necessary, at least in some areas. But if
enough consumers can distinguish genuine from fraudulent local food,
and there is sufficient competition among local food outlets, markets
may have the necessary incentives to police themselves. Any proposed
solution must be sensitive to the need to minimize costs to market
participants (in dollars, time, and effort) to ensure that farmers’ markets
remain attractive to consumers and producers, as well as to the many
competing demands on police and regulatory agencies. This Article
identifies the problem of farmers’ market fraud, explores existing efforts
to prevent it, and makes some tentative suggestions as to how markets
and governments can better address the problem.

16

LINDSAY DAY-FARNSWORTH ET AL., SCALING UP: MEETING THE DEMAND FOR
LOCAL FOOD, at i (2009).
17 See NEIL D. HAMILTON, NAT’L. CTR. FOR AGRIC. LAW RESEARCH & INFO.,
FARMERS’ MARKETS: RULES, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 28 (2002), available at
http://www.nyfarmersmarket.com/pdf_files/fmruleregs.pdf
(“There
is
widespread
agreement among public officials, market advocates, and farmers that allowing other
products to be sold can be detrimental to both the value of the market for farmers and to
the quality of the market experience for shoppers. . . . The sale of produce by those who did
not raise it defeats the idea of a ‘farmers’ market, is deceptive for consumers who may not
realize the distinction, and creates unfair competition for local farmers at the market.”).
18 See, e.g. infra Part III.A.2.
19 See infra text accompanying note 104.
20 See infra notes 59, 127 and accompanying text.
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Part I describes the rise of the local food movement and why direct
sales to consumers through farmers’ markets are so popular with both
farmers and consumers. Part II, however, shows that some consumers
might not be getting the produce they believe they are purchasing and
how seller fraud can damage honest farmers’ businesses by both
undercutting them in the short term and potentially eroding consumer
trust in the long term. Part III of this Article explores solutions,
including market and seller agreements, regulatory approaches, and
criminal penalties. It concludes that where consumers are able to
differentiate between locally-grown and distant produce and where there
is healthy competition among markets in a region, markets will likely be
adequately incentivized to police themselves by heightening rules and
enforcement. For markets that lack these competitive incentives,
however, state regulations implemented by market boards and managers
(taking advantage of their local knowledge) would likely be an attractive
approach. With more attention to the potential for fraud, markets and
governments can better protect both consumers and farmers.
I. THE VALUE OF LOCAL FOOD
Farmers’ markets are increasingly popular, rising from 1,755
markets operating in 1994 to 8,144 in 2013.21 Consumers demand local
food to fulfill various environmental and social values 22—or simply to
find better-tasting produce23—and farmers benefit from opportunities for
high-priced sales to loyal buyers.24 There is no widely-accepted definition
of “local,”25 but this Article addresses the type of local food that
consumers think they are buying at producer-only farmers’ markets:
produce that was grown at a farm somewhere nearby. 26 These producer21 Agric. Mktg. Serv., National Count of Farmers Market Directory Listing Graph:
1994–2013, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplate
Data.do?template=TemplateS&leftNav=WholesaleandFarmersMarkets&page=WFM
FarmersMarketGrowth&description=Farmers%20Market%20Growth (last modified Aug.
8, 2013).
22 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
23 See Curtis, supra note 5, at 28.
24 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25 STEVE MARTINEZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS
IMPACTS AND ISSUES, at iii (2010) (observing that “[t]hough ‘local’ has a geographic
connotation, there is no consensus on a definition in terms of the distance between
production and consumption,” and noting that the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act defines “locally and regionally produced” food as food that is transported “less than 400
miles from its origin or within the state in which it is produced”); Megan Galey & A. Bryan
Endres, Locating the Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y
3, 5 (2012) (noting different definitions used by states, “grocery stores, restaurants, and
farmers’ markets” and in the Farm Bill).
26 See supra note 2 for a definition of producer-only farmers’ markets.
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only markets are popular, comprising more than 60% of all farmers’
markets.27 The sources of their popularity are explored briefly below.
A. Consumers
A diverse, incompletely overlapping set of consumer values drives
the steadily growing demand for local food. Alice Waters, Michael Pollan,
and other leaders of the U.S. slow food movement believe that “cooking
should be based on the finest and freshest seasonal ingredients that are
produced sustainably and locally”28 and view the movement as
embodying a “set of cultural practices” and “even a way of life.” 29 These
connoisseurs of local produce tie together taste and social values,
demanding delicious produce and a “food economy that is ‘good, clean,
and fair,’ ”30 and, increasingly, consumers share some or all of these
values. Buyers looking for freshness and flavor are drawn to produceronly markets for obvious reasons. Consumers seeking fairness in food
derive substantial utility from the knowledge that they are supporting a
local farmer, whom they may know, 31 rather than a large, faceless
agribusiness. Agribusiness nearly always wins out in the national
market for food, with its economies of scale and government subsidies,
but some consumers of local food hope to tilt the scales in favor of the
family farmer.
The values of “clean” and “fair food” also connote environmental
concerns. Large factory farms send massive quantities of pollution into
interstate rivers,32 and many consumers view family farms—particularly

27 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL FARMERS MARKET MANAGER SURVEY 2006, at 20
(2009) (showing that 60.1 percent markets involve direct retail sales only). It is not clear
that all retail sales involve sales directly from the producer, but the same report indicates
that on average nationwide, more than 70% of vendors “reported to be producers selling
goods they had grown and/or produced themselves.” Id. at 51.
28 Stella Lucia Volpe, The Slow Food Movement, ACSM’S HEALTH & FITNESS J.,
May–June 2012, at 29, 29; CHEZ PANISSE RESTAURANT, http://www.chezpanisse.com/about/
alice-waters (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
29 Michael Pollan, Cruising on the Ark of Taste, MOTHER JONES, May–June 2003, at
75, 76.
30 CHEZ PANISSE RESTAURANT, supra note 28.
31 DARBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6, 10 (concluding from a survey of 530 respondents
that, after freshness, “[s]upporting local businesses was the next most frequently cited
reason” for purchasing local produce); Curtis, supra note 5, at 30 (noting the “high
importance” that CSA members, in particular, place on “supporting local farmers”).
32 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 2000 REPORT,
at ES-3, 65, 74, 80, 82, 96, 140 (2002) (noting that states reported that agricultural
nonpoint source (“NPS”) pollution was the leading source of water quality impairment and
that the use of animal feeding operations, pesticides, irrigation water and fertilizer, among
other activities, can cause this pollution).

2014]

FRAUD IN THE MARKET

373

those they can visit and thus experience first-hand—as more benign.33
Some vendors at farmers’ markets also offer organic or “pesticide-free”
produce,34 which can reduce harmful pollution and potentially provide
health benefits to consumers.35 Locavores further point to the shorter
transport distances required for local produce,36 although some studies
suggest that local agriculture does not have a smaller carbon footprint
than its centralized counterpart.37 Beyond pollution, some local food
enthusiasts prefer the non-genetically modified “heirloom” produce that
some small farms offer, favoring plant diversity and traditional
agriculture over the engineered monocultures that tend to dominate
large farms and their perceived health and environmental risks. 38
Finally, meat consumers prefer free-range chicken and pasture-fed beef
not only for taste but also to avoid supporting inhumane conditions on
factory farms.39 And as introduced above, consumers of local food like
knowing where their food came from and how it was grown for safety
reasons.40 In a world of e-coli scares and growing distrust of the
government’s ability to protect the food supply, local food plucked fresh
from the fields seems safer and more predictable.
33 See, e.g., PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that consumers in one
survey placed “high importance” on “pesticide use on fresh produce they purchase”).
34 Cf. Organic Market Overview, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/
natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-overview.
aspx#.UuPeTfQo6c9 (last updated June 19, 2012) (noting that “7 percent of U.S. organic
food sales occur through farmers’ markets, foodservice, and marketing channels other than
retail stores”).
35 PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that a majority of survey
respondents perceived organic and locally-grown food to be healthier than conventionally
sourced food, and noting that although there are few studies linking organics to better
health, such studies are growing in number). But cf. Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., Are
Organic Foods Safer or Healthier than Conventional Alternatives?, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 348, 359 (2012) (finding few health benefits from eating organic in lieu of
conventional produce).
36 See PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 2, 7 (noting, based on a survey with 500
usable responses, that 50% responded that the “distance traveled” (by the produce) was
“ ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ important,” although higher percentages of respondents cared about
“pesticide use,” “date harvested,” and “food safety inspection”).
37 Christopher L. Weber & H. Scott Matthews, Food-Miles and the Relative Climate
Impacts of Food Choices in the United States, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3508, 3508 (2008).
38 See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 29, at 75 (noting that members of the local food
movement “aimed to save endangered domestic plants and animals”).
39 Cf. Kelli Boylen, Marketing Animal Welfare with Certification, HAY & FORAGE
GROWER (Aug. 10, 2012), http://hayandforage.com/beef/marketing-animal-welfarecertification (describing increasingly popular “Animal Welfare Approved” (“AWA”)
certification and an AWA-certified farmer who sells grass-fed beef at a farmers’ market);
Standards, ANIMAL WELFARE APPROVED, http://animalwelfareapproved.org/standards (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014) (describing standards for the humane treatment of farm animals).
40 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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B. Farmers and Communities
Small farmers have responded enthusiastically to the steadily rising
demand for local foods. Some accommodate consumers’ desire for a
connection with their food source by posting pictures of their goats and
cows at their sales booths and offering farm tours. They pile oddlyshaped heirloom tomatoes and purple carrots into baskets, offer free
samples to highlight the flavor of freshly-picked produce, and suggest
recipes for experimenting with new seasonal vegetables that consumers
might not have previously encountered. And in exchange, they collect a
healthy price for their wares. Farmers are often able to set prices that
are comparable to, if not higher than,41 those found in grocery stores
while avoiding shipping costs and more stringent labeling and packaging
requirements.42 Cutting out the middleman can also generate
substantial savings—farmers in California, for example, make “less than
20 cents on the consumer’s full dollar” when selling through
wholesalers.43 Studies of farmer revenues from farmers’ markets show
average annual sales per farmer ranging from $7,000 to more than
$11,000 annually,44 and that a substantial percentage of farmers at
markets rely solely on these venues for produce sales. 45
Farmers’ markets also benefit communities—creating direct
economic impacts and sometimes pulling shoppers to downtown areas
and causing spending beyond the food sector. In terms of direct impact,
the City of Portland, Oregon, for example, estimates that “[i]n 2007, the
14 farmers’ markets in Portland sold goods totaling an estimated
aggregate of nearly $11.2 million,”46 which created “just under 100 direct
jobs,” “over $1.3 million in employee compensation,” and “induced”
contributions—such as “personal spending done by the farmer . . . or her
market worker”—of more than $1.8 million.47 More broadly, farmers’

41

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43 See Hardesty, supra note 4, at 5.
44 Cheryl Brown & Stacy Miller, The Impacts of Local Markets: A Review of
Research on Farmers Markets and Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), 90 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 1296, 1297 (2008). Some states had lower sales, though. In Iowa, only 30% of
market vendors had “annual sales greater than $5,000.” Id. (citing Theresa Varner &
Daniel Otto, Factors Affecting Sales at Farmers’ Markets: An Iowa Study, 30 REV. AGRIC.
ECON. 176, 185 (2008)).
45 Id. (showing that in 2006, 25% of vendors relied on farmers’ market sales for
their “sole source of farm income”).
46 Memorandum from Bonnie Gee Yosick to Clark Worth (Sept. 23, 2008), available
at http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/236588.
47 Id.
42
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markets can drive economic and social interactions that “create the basis
for the emergence of new local food systems.” 48
II. THE THREAT OF FRAUD
In light of the growth of farmers’ markets, and the opportunity to
resell certain mass-produced produce at a premium49 without dealing
with labeling, packaging and middlemen,50 there are reasonably strong
incentives for farmers’ market fraud. And fraud detection is difficult: A
local carrot may be nearly identical to a “foreign” carrot. Fraud harms
both consumers, who do not get what they pay for, and honest farmers,
who are undercut by more cheaply-produced produce masquerading as
local.51 As one Wisconsin farmer complained with respect to resellers,
“ ‘We sell four cucumbers for $1 and they sell eight for $1.’ ”52
Equally troublingly, an erosion of consumer trust in farmers’ claims
that they grew the food they sell could damage the entire enterprise,
harming both consumers and farmers. Although there appear to have
been no empirical studies of the extent or degree of fraud, anecdotal
evidence suggests that it is a common concern among market organizers
and, in some cases, governments and consumers.
In California, where the state has certified certain markets as local
since 197753 and boasts the largest number of farmers’ markets in the
country,54 there have been numerous recent allegations of fraud. A Los
Angeles television station conducted an undercover investigation in 2010
and found one seller “loading up his truck, with boxes of produce from
big commercial farms as far away as Mexico.” 55 The seller indicated that
“everything” he sold at the farmers’ market came from his field, but
when the NBC crew investigated his farm, he could not show the
investigators “most of the produce he was selling, such as celery, garlic,
and avocados.”56 When asked about the lack of avocados on his property,

48

Brown & Miller, supra note 44, at 1300.
See supra note 8.
50 See supra note 9.
51 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
52 Lauren Etter, Food for Thought: Do You Need Farmers for a Farmers Market?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at A1.
53 See Certified Farmers Market Program, CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC.,
http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/cfm.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
54 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Celebrates National Farmers Market
Week, August 4–10 (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
usdamediafb?contentid=2013/08/0155.xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true (showing
759 markets in California, followed by 637 in New York and 336 in Illinois).
55 Grover & Goldberg, supra note 12.
56 Id.
49
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the seller responded, “That I’ll be honest. That stuff came from
somewhere else.”57 In other field visits, the journalists “found farms full
of weeds, or dry dirt, instead of rows of the vegetables that were being
sold at the markets.”58 The investigation stoked enough concern among
farmers, market managers, and consumers to cause the state’s Farmers’
Market Advisory Committee to propose a new enforcement program with
higher fees and closer enforcement.59 An attorney for the California
Federation of Certified Farmers’ Markets suggested that there was “a
growing trend of misrepresentations in all forms . . . of agricultural
product marketing.”60 From August 2012 through August 2013, the state
issued nine suspensions, revocations, or fines to sellers for “selling
product not of [their] own production,” 61 and sixty-six notices of
noncompliance to sellers selling products not listed on their state
producer certifications.62
In a separate California investigation in 2012, San Diego County’s
Department of Agriculture, Weights, and Measures, through undercover
agents, found one seller who “wasn’t even growing the broccoli or
Brussels sprouts he was selling.”63 The seller later “pleaded guilty to a
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500
[false/misleading advertising].”64
Anecdotal evidence of fraud is not limited to California. According to
a state newspaper, the manager of the Coventry Regional Farmers
Market in Connecticut notes that “constant rumbling” about fraud is a

57

Id.
Id.
59 Kate Campbell, Farmers Market Enforcement Fees Could Increase, AG ALERT
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.agalert.com/story/?id=1889 (noting that “interest was
heightened” following Southern California media reports of conventional produce being
sold at farmers’ markets).
60 Id.
61 CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CERTIFIED FARMERS MKT. PROGRAM, REVOKED,
SUSPENDED, AND/OR FINED LIST (2013), available at www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/pdfs/CPC_
Suspension_2013_2nd_quarter.pdf.
62 CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CERTIFIED FARMERS MKT. PROGRAM, CFM NONCOMPLIANCE WORKSHEET JANUARY–DECEMBER 2013, available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/
is/pdfs/CFM_Noncompliance_List.pdf.
63 Clare Leschin-Hoar, When Fraud Hits the Farmers Market, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO,
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://voiceofsandiego.org/2013/04/09/when-fraud-hits-the-farmers-market/.
64 Letter from Kathryn Lange Turner, Deputy City Attorney, Office of the City
Attorney, City of San Diego, to Mark Lyles, Inspector, Dep’t of Agric., Weights & Measures
(Mar. 13, 2013) (alteration in original), available at http://voiceofsandiego.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/51644b41b3233.pdf.pdf.
58
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“huge concern,”65 and at least one seller in Shelton “had strawberries, an
early crop, in late summer.”66 In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a seller had out
of season zucchinis with “wax on them”—a tip-off that the zucchinis had
not been plucked fresh from the field. 67 And in Michigan, a well-known,
local organic farmer was accused of buying produce from wholesalers. 68
Furthermore, a Virginia study found that “[s]ome farmers seem to be
buying a great volume of the produce they sell,”69 and an organization in
Pennsylvania believes that resellers of produce “capture over 90 percent”
of the value of Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program vouchers, through
which certain individuals can use government-issued checks to purchase
produce at farmers’ markets.70 The problem does not appear to be limited
to the United States—in the United Kingdom, market managers
observed: “The markets are only supposed to stock ‘local produce,’ but
last week we discovered spinach from Portugal and Spain—produced by
another supermarket supplier—being sold at a farmers market . . . even
legitimate stallholders are ‘topping up’ their locally grown produce with
vegetables bought from Britain’s wholesale markets.”71
It is difficult to assess the scope of the fraud problem. Much fraud
may be undetected, and much detected fraud may be unreported.
Nonetheless, market managers and sellers worry that even a few
incidents can have potentially large impacts on markets. In one West
Virginia survey with 102 vendor respondents, when asked about the
“largest obstacles to their success,” 20 vendors “indicated an obstacle
with vendors who sold products they did not produce themselves, many
of them charging lower prices making it difficult to compete.”72 And,

65 Jan Ellen Spiegel, Fraud Happens at Connecticut’s Farmers’ Markets—but Not
Often, CT. MIRROR (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.ctmirror.org/fraud-happens-connecticutsfarmers-markets-not-often/.
66 Id.
67 Etter, supra note 52.
68 Kimberley Willis, Fraud at the Farmers Market, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.examiner.com/article/fraud-at-the-farmers-market.
69 VA. DEP’T FOR THE AGING, SENIOR FARMERS’ MARKET NUTRITION PROGRAM 4
(2012).
70 SHELLY GROW & LYDIA OBERHOLTZER, THE USE OF FARMERS’ MARKET NUTRITION
PROGRAMS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC 6 (2003).
71 Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas & Claire Newell, Focus: Farmers’ Markets Sell
‘Supermarket’ Foods, SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 8, 2007), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/
news/uk_news/article62830.ece.
72 Stacy Miller et al., Educational Needs and Perceived Obstacles Identified by
Farmers’ Markets in West Virginia, in 2006 NORTH CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION
RESEARCH CONFERENCE 122, 130 (Neil A. Knobloch ed. 2006), available at
http://aged.caf.wvu.edu/Research/AAAE-NC-2006/2006%20North%20Central%20
Research%20Conference%20Proceedings.pdf#page=131.
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although they believe that the fraud is not widespread, 73 Connecticut
farmers worry that “ ‘[y]ou’re one news story away from ruining it for
everyone’ ”74 by eroding consumer trust. Indeed, fear of losing customers
may have driven at least one farmers’ market to try to cover up fraud
allegations: A market manager who worked for an organization that ran
18 Southern California markets alleged that the organization
discouraged her from reporting fraud “violations to authorities” and
“retaliated against her after she did so anyway.”75 This demonstrates
that although competition among markets to attract locavores will often
inspire careful monitoring of producer-only claims, it could also lead to a
damaging tendency to cheat on a market level.
III. PREVENTING FRAUD
To combat the threat of fraud, markets, local governments, and
states have experimented with a variety of approaches, including
contractual, regulatory, and criminal solutions. This Part explores these
approaches to fraud and suggests that where consumers can adequately
differentiate local and non-local produce and there is market competition
in the area, markets will be adequately incentivized to enhance and
enforce producer-only rules. Conversely, where these conditions are not
present, a hybrid model in which a state-mandated enforcement regime
is carried out by local market managers may be a cost-effective solution.
This will be particularly important for larger markets, which cannot
simply rely on norms and vendor monitoring to address fraud concerns.76
A. Contractual Approaches
Market managers and farmers’ market boards—and the participant
sellers—are closest to the problem, and many markets already attempt
to regulate fraud through various provisions in market rules and seller
agreements. Indeed, producer-only markets that fear losing discerning
customers to other competing markets will be highly incentivized to
expand these protections. The most common approaches include
73

See Spiegel, supra note 65.
Id.
75 David Karp, Market Watch: Farmers Market Cheating Alleged, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/10/food/la-fo-marketwatch-20101105.
76 See, e.g., GARRY STEPHENSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE LINK BETWEEN
FARMERS’ MARKET SIZE AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 13 (2007), available at
http://smallfarms.oregonstate.edu/sites/default/files/small-farms-tech-report/eesc_1082e.pdf (quoting one market manager: “You can’t be everywhere and you don’t know what’s
happening at that other end of the market now. . . . When it’s a smaller market you have a
much closer relationship. And so vendor problems are part of it; you have more vendor
problems with a large market.”).
74
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requiring producer commitments to sell only producer-grown produce,
mandating submission of lists of products to be sold throughout the
upcoming market season, and conducting farm inspections to verify
production, backed by sanctions including expulsion. A 2002 survey of
market managers at Mid-Atlantic producer-only markets found that
“[t]hirty-seven percent of managers used an application or contract that
spells out the producer-only rule,” with two of these managers requiring
plans describing what producers will sell.77 Forty-seven percent of
respondents indicated “that they do farm inspections, either personally
or by committee,” although not always regularly. 78
1. Matching Crop Lists and Acreages with Products Sold
Market agreements between market managers and sellers often
require sellers to provide, before the selling season, lists of the crops that
they will sell or acreages of crops and, in some cases, how much of which
crop they will sell.79 Actual sales must then match these lists.80
Descriptions of acreages indicate the amount of food that farmers can
realistically sell; if a farmer with a half-acre comes to market with 500
watermelons, market managers will likely be suspicious. Based on the
author’s non-scientific survey of market rules, requirements for crop lists
and acreages are common among producer-only markets. Washington,
DC’s FRESHFARM Markets provide, for example,
Only items listed in your completed application can be sold at the
FRESHFARM Markets. You must list all food and products that you
plan to bring to market. Items not listed will be allowed for sale only
with advance approval by the FRESHFARM Markets’ management.
If you want to bring additional or new products to market that are
not on your original market application, you must let market
management know in writing what those products are and get prior
approval from market management before bringing these products to
market.81

77

OBERHOLTZER & GROW, supra note 1, at 15.
Id.; see also HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 28 (noting that “[t]o accomplish the
‘producer only’ goal, markets typically have rules defining what can and cannot be sold at
the market and creating extensive processes for determining the eligibility of products and
producers to participate in the market” and providing examples of market rules).
79 See, e.g., Market Agreement, Urban Harvest, Inc., Urban Harvest Farmers
Market Vendor Application, available at http://urbanharvest.org/documents/118591/
226131/market+vendor+application.pdf/.
80 See, e.g., id.
81 Market Rules, FRESHFARM Markets., FRESHFARM Markets Rules and
Procedures 13 (2013–2014) [hereinafter FRESHFARM Market Rules], available at
http://www.freshfarmmarket.org/pdfs/2013_rules_and_regulations.pdf.
78
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The City of Chicago, which prohibits vendors from selling “products
from another farm without full transparency,” asks vendors to “list all
sites including a map” for each farm or orchard site, showing “farm
boundaries, growing areas, crop locations, and storage sheds,
packing/processing facility locations,” as well as the number of acres on
the farm and acres in production.82
The Putnam Farmers’ Market in West Virginia similarly requires
that producers only sell food they have produced, although they may
resell other local farmers’ food under a “provisional arrangement.” 83
Putnam also requires vendors to submit a “product plan with their
application,”84 which must list the products they grow,85 just as the
Brownsville, Texas market, which requires that “[a]ll vendors’ farms or
production areas must be located within the state of Texas,” 86 mandates
that vendors “list all items that you would like to sell” and, if they sell
shrimp, to show that they “own the boats that caught the shrimp.”87
The Hernando, Mississippi Farmers Market indicates that its
market managers “believe strongly in the origin of a product and
promote our market as a place where customers can buy LOCAL
products.”88 The vendor application also asks the seller: “Do you grow all
your produce and/or raise all your animals . . . ?” and indicates that if the
seller “anticipate[s] purchasing any crops/product from, or selling for, a
local farmer,” she must have a certificate for these crops.89 Sellers at the
82 Market Agreement, City of Chicago, City of Chicago Farmers Markets
Application 2013 (Nov. 2012) (on file with the Regent University Law Review).
83 Market Rules, Putnam Farmers’ Market, Market Rules of the Putnam Farmers’
Market 2012, at 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter Putnam Market Rules], available at
http://putnamfarmersmarket.weebly.com/uploads/6/9/6/4/6964545/market_rules_of_the_
putnam_farmers.pdf.
84 Id. at 2.
85 Market Application, Putnam Farmers’ Market, 2014 Vendor Application of
Interest (2014), available at http://putnamfarmersmarket.weebly.com/uploads/6/9/6/4/
6964545/vendor_application_2014.pdf (requiring the applicant to indicate which items they
are interested in selling).
86 Market Agreement, Brownsville Farmers’ Market, Brownsville Farmers’ Market
Vendor Contract (2009–2010), available at http://www.brownsvillefarmersmarket.com.
php5-13.dfw1-1.websitetestlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Vendor_Contract_20092010-Season.pdf.
87 Market Application, Brownsville Farmers’ Market, Produce Vendor Application
Form, available at http://www.brownsvillefarmersmarket.com.php5-13.dfw1-1.websitetest
link.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Produce-Vendor-Application-Form.pdf.
88 Market Application, Hernando Farmers Market, Hernando Farmers Market 2013
Vendor Application (2013) [hereinafter Hernando Market Application], available at
http://cityofhernando.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2013-Hernando-Farmers-Marketapplication-packet.pdf.
89 Id.
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Hernando market must submit an Affidavit/Grower Certificate that
describes the total acreage of the farm and the acreage of “fruits,
vegetables, or flowers for sale” as well as a list of all of the produce the
farmer “intend[s] to sell” during the year.90
Not all markets are so stringent, however. In Walpole, New
Hampshire, market guidelines provide that “[g]rowers may sell only
what they grow or raise on their own farms,” and “[e]ach vendor must
agree, in writing, to comply with the letter and spirit of these
guidelines,” with “fraudulent or dishonest practices” prohibited. 91
Vendors also must list “what [they]’d like to sell” and the location of
their land, but crop lists and acreages are not required. 92 Other markets
similarly do not request specific produce lists but demand certification,
in writing, that sellers will grow the produce they propose to sell. The
City of Parkersburg, West Virginia Downtown Farmers’ Marketplace
rules and regulations provide that “[a]ll products for sale at the
Marketplace must be produced by the vendor” 93 and require vendor
applicants to verify that they are “the actual producers of the specifi[c]
items which they intend to sell.”94
Even for markets that require a list of produce to be sold or acreage
of the crops that will produce vegetables and fruits to be sold, or a
written certification showing that produce is local, it is not clear how
carefully or how often market managers compare lists and acreages with
the types and quantities of produce sold. And even with careful checking,
quantities are very difficult to verify; if a grower has indicated a
particular acreage or listed a particular type and amount of produce she
will sell, the amount actually sold at market weekly can only be roughly
compared with the amount of produce the farmer claimed she would
produce. Verifying whether produce is locally grown is also difficult from
a seasonal perspective—although a farmer might list strawberries as a
type of fruit to be sold at market, managers should be suspect if a farmer
in New England sells strawberries, an early summer crop, in August.
Within market rules and vendor agreements many market managers
90

Id.
Market Rules, Walpole Farmers Market, Walpole Farmers Market Guidelines 5–
6 (2013) [hereinafter Walpole Market Rules], available at http://walpolenhfarmersmarket.
files.wordpress.com/2013/06/walpole-farmers-market-guidelines-2013.pdf.
92 Market Admin, WALPOLE FARMERS MARKET, http://walpolefarmersmarket.com/
market-admin (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
93 Market Rules, City of Parkersburg, Downtown Farmers’ Marketplace 2013
Market Rules and Regulations 2 (2013) [hereinafter Parkersburg Market Rules], available
at
http://downtownfarmersmarketplace.com/downloads/2013-Market-Rules-andRegulations-Final.pdf.
94 Id. at 3.
91
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have some options for enforcement, however, as discussed in the
following section.
2. Inspections and Peer Monitoring
Some farmers’ markets stop at requiring crop lists. The Hernando,
Mississippi Farmers’ Market, for example, lists as a possible violation of
the rules “[s]elling items not within the guidelines of the market,” but
does not include other mechanisms for identifying violations.95 Many
farmers’ markets, however, use inspections by a market manager or
board as an enforcement mechanism. In Putnam, West Virginia, “[a]ll
new [vendor] applicants will be visited by the Verification committee” to
confirm that they are producers “of the specified items that they intend
to sell.”96 In the same state, the Parkersburg market rules provide: “By
submitting an application, vendors agree that the Farmers Market
Manager or their designee may inspect the vendor’s farm or facilities to
insure [sic] compliance.”97 In California, the North San Diego Certified
Farmers Market (“NSDCFM”) is even more explicit in granting market
managers permission to inspect: “Producer/seller grants permission to
the NSDCFM manager or other NSDCFM staff to enter the seller’s
premises for the reasonable inspection of land, facilities, product(s) and
records in order to determine whether the seller is in compliance with
Market regulations and permit conditions.”98
Several Texas markets have similar provisions. The Brazos Valley
Farmers’ Market indicates that “[m]embers are allowed to sell farm
products that are grown and/or made by themselves,” 99 and growers, in
submitting membership applications, agree to permit farm inspections
and to “sell only items as specified” by the market rules.100 The San
Antonio Farmers’ Market appoints a market board member-at-large to
chair the “Produce Verification” committee, which conducts an “initial
land verification” and presents its “findings to [the] membership

95

Hernando Market Application, supra note 88.
Putnam Market Rules, supra note 83, at 4.
97 Parkersburg Market Rules, supra note 93, at 6.
98 Market Rules, North San Diego Certified Farmers Market, 2013–2014 Market
Rules 9 (2013) [hereinafter NSDCFM Market Rules], available at http://docs.nsdcfm.com/
MarketRules.pdf.
99 Market Rules, Brazos Valley Farmers’ Market Association, Rules and
Regulations 1, available at http://brazosvalleyfarmersmarket.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/01/2009-Rules-and-Regulations.pdf.
100 Market Application, Brazos Valley Farmers’ Market Association, 2014
Application for Membership 1 (2014), available at http://brazosvalleyfarmersmarket.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Brazos-Valley-Farmers-Market-application-form-2008-1.pdf.
96
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committee.”101 And the Barton Creek Farmers Market in Austin, Texas,
provides for farm inspections “by a professional inspector or a Market
Manager” or “participating growers,” and farmers must be prepared for
“surprise inspections immediately following (but not limited to) the
market day.”102 Chicago also allows inspection without notification, and
“[f]ailure to allow such an inspection will constitute a violation of market
rules.”103
Inspections, of course, are not foolproof mechanisms for
enforcement. Produce might be simply sitting on site, not growing, thus
failing to indicate whether it was produced in state, or the produce might
not be the type of crop it appears to be in the field. As a Milwaukee,
Wisconsin manager noted when she inspected a watermelon farm, “all of
the melons were . . . in a pile under a tree,” and “[i]t was impossible to
tell whether they had bought them and stored them there, or whether
they had grown and harvested them.” 104 Other monitors in Connecticut
indicated that a farmer “ ‘showed us a large planting of corn and said,
“There’s my sweet corn,” . . . . Later we learned that he showed us a field
of cow corn.’ ”105
Other markets explicitly rely on peer monitoring in addition to or in
lieu of direct farm inspections. Under Walpole, New Hampshire’s market
guidelines, “Any vendor who becomes aware of a violation of these
guidelines is responsible to report that violation, in writing, to a
Coordinator.”106 In some cases, at least, producers do appear to monitor
each other—too much so, in fact. In East Granby, Connecticut, farmers
who accuse peers of cheating must pay a fee for doing so; if they are
correct, the fee is returned, but they forfeit the fee if the accusation is
meritless.107
101 Market Rules, San Antonio Farmer’s Market Association, By-Laws 2010, at 4–5
(2010), available at http://www.sanantoniofarmersmarket.org/S_A_Farmers_Mkt_bylaws.pdf.
102 Market Rules, Barton Creek Farmers Market, Rules 9 (2011) [hereinafter Barton
Creek Market Rules], available at http://www.bartoncreekfarmersmarket.org/wp-content/
uploads/vendorrules.pdf.
103 Market Rules, City of Chicago, 2014 Chicago Farmers and Community Market
Program Rules & Regulations for Growers, Food Producers, and Non-Food Vendors (2014)
[hereinafter Chicago Market Rules] available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/
city/depts/dca/Farmers%20Market/FarmersMarketRulesRegs2014.pdf.
104 Sarah Johnson, Defining and Defending a Producer-Only Market, MARKET BEET
(Farmers Mkt. Coal., Kimberton, Pa.), Winter 2010, at 3, 4, available at
http://ecbiz71.inmotionhosting.com/~farmer8/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/FMC-MarketBeet-Winter-2010_w_links.pdf.
105 Spiegel, supra note 65.
106 Walpole Market Rules, supra note 91, at 7.
107 Spiegel, supra note 65.
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3. Sanctions
Whether producer fraud is revealed through an inspection or a peer
complaint, sanctions appear to be similar around the country. Many
market rules provide that sellers will be suspended for one day from the
market if a violation is found, or for several weeks. 108 If repeat violations
occur, or a particularly egregious deviation from rules is found, the
vendor might be suspended from the market for the season. 109 Under
“three strikes” provisions or sanctions for the worst violations, vendors
are permanently suspended from selling at the market. 110 Fines are, in
some cases, issued for any of these violation stages, and vendors
typically may appeal the violation to a market board designated for this
purpose.111 The North San Diego Certified Farmers’ Market shows how
violations depend on the frequency with which they occur or, for each
violation, the level of egregiousness of the violation: “The severity of any
penalty or discipline imposed by the Market Manager shall be directly
related to the gravity or repetition of the violation.” 112 Producers who for
the first time “sell products not of their own production” are suspended
from the market for 30 days, whereas a second violation of the produceronly requirement “shall result in permanent disqualification from the
market.”113 Identical language with respect to gravity and repetition of
the violation is used in Chicago, 114 and if the city’s Department of
Cultural Affairs and Special Events “repeatedly suspects a vendor of reselling product, this is grounds for suspension or dismissal from market.
It is the vendor’s responsibility to provide proof of production in a

108

E.g., Barton Creek Market Rules, supra note 102 (explaining the market
manager may suspend vendors who violate the rules); Chicago Market Rules, supra note
103 (reserving the right to refuse any vendor who does not keep the rules); Hernando
Market Application, supra note 88 (providing that penalties range from one day suspension
to permanent expulsion); NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10 (providing for a
thirty day suspension for selling produce grown by others).
109 E.g., NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10 (noting that penalties for
violations can include suspension for up to eighteen months).
110 See, e.g., Market Rules, Noblesville Main Street, Noblesville Farmers Market
2014 Agreement 4–5 (2014), available at http://www.noblesvillemainstreet.org/uploads/
Farmers_Market_Agreement_2014__final2.6.14_.pdf; NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note
98, at 10.
111 E.g., Barton Creek Market Rules, supra note 102 (explaining the market
manager’s authority to impose fines for violations and the corresponding appeal process);
NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 2 (explaining an appeals process).
112 NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10.
113 Id.
114 Chicago Market Rules, supra note 103 (“The severity of any penalty or discipline
imposed by DCASE will be directly related to the gravity or repetition of the violation.”).
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written appeal.”115 At Crescent City Farmers’ Market in New Orleans,
individuals tasked with enforcement provide written notification to
vendors for the first four violations, followed by allowing the vendor to
stay at the market on the day of the fourth strike but suspending her the
following week, a similar action but a two-week suspension for the fifth
strike, a month-long suspension for strike six, and permanent
suspension beyond this.116
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Contractual Approaches
Most farmers’ markets take on primary responsibility for setting
rules and enforcing them, although some are more diligent than others
in ensuring that violations will be noticed and enforced. There are
substantial advantages to this dispersed system, which relies on those
closest to the farmers to ensure that produce sold at markets is produced
nearby. This system takes advantage of local knowledge—in small
towns, market managers might happen to drive by farms even when not
formally inspecting them. Local decision-making also allows markets to
adapt rules, inspections, and enforcement policies to local conditions and
needs; in states where crops can be grown in several seasons, for
example, market managers might not need to make as many inspections
during the year to confirm that the produce sold week-to-week is local.
Markets in small towns without much farmer entry and exit might also
be able to impose relatively light rules, as norms likely will prevail
within these relatively closed communities. Farmers in these
communities know their neighbors and will impose various shaming
mechanisms and other informal modes of punishment if cheating occurs
at the market. Additionally, competition for locavores will drive both
vendors and market managers to closely monitor grower behavior.
Despite the many advantages of relying primarily on markets to set
their own rules and enforce them, the system has substantial downsides
similar to those observed in a federal-state regulatory system. Markets—
particularly relatively new ones that are just establishing a presence in a
community—might lack the resources to hire managers and other
officials and pay them to conduct regular and thorough inspections. 117
And the number of inspections or other mechanisms needed to verify
that produce is local will often require too much time and effort for
115

Id.
HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 22.
117 See KARL FOORD, UNIV. OF MINN. EXTENSION SERV., MANAGING THE FARMERS’
MARKET 9–10 (n.d.), available at http://mfma.le3.getliveedit.com/files/283.pdf (suggesting
that Minnesota farmers oppose a system like California’s certification of producer’s only
markets, as inspection fees associated with certification—$250 annually—would be viewed
negatively).
116
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volunteers. Further, as shown by the allegations that one market
organization discouraged a manager from publicizing fraud,118 internal
politics could prevent market managers from consistently and fairly
enforcing rules. Managers want markets to succeed and might be
hesitant to encourage strict policing; they might also favor certain sellers
over others, thus leading to inconsistent and unfair enforcement. Both
norms and more formal policies can lead to unpalatable conduct. In
Tomah, Wisconsin, a local farmer who asked the city council to consider
banning resellers reported that “a vendor who grows his apples but also
resells pumpkins[] made ‘verbal threats to bash my head in while
swinging a cane in my direction.’ ”119
B. Regulatory
Rather than rely on markets to police themselves, some state and
local governments have deployed regulatory schemes to address farmers’
market fraud. This regulation occurs at the city, county, or state level,
and it often mimics rules, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties
imposed by markets, although it sometimes takes a more stringent
approach.
1. County and State Laws
California appears to have one of the most aggressive farmers’
market regulatory programs. State laws allow county agricultural
commissioners to issue “[a] certified farmers’ market certificate,” which
is valid for twelve months after it is issued. 120 This certificate guarantees
that only local produce is sold at the farmers’ market, and the state
provides various mechanisms to fund county enforcement of provisions
that ensure localism.121 Agricultural commissioners “may charge a
certification and inspection fee up to a maximum rate of sixty dollars
($60) per hour.”122 Although the rules do not specify that producers at the
markets must be certified, they have provisions for certifying individual
producers and require markets to pay “a fee equal to the number of
certified producer certificates and other agricultural producers
participating on each market day.”123 For each certified producer at each
market, the commissioner must “perform at least one annual onsite
inspection” of the site(s) listed on each seller’s certificate “to verify
118
119
120
121
122
123

See Karp, supra note 75.
Etter, supra note 52.
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 47020(a) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
E.g., id. § 47020 (Westlaw) (providing that fees may be charged for inspections).
Id. § 47020(a) (Westlaw).
Id. § 47021(a) (Westlaw).
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production of the commodities listed on the certificate or the existence in
storage of the harvested production, or both.”124 Enforcing officers also
“may seize and hold as evidence” produce if a violation is suspected, 125
and the produce may be used as evidence in actions taken by counties.126
These inspection rules do not solve the problems experienced by
many markets with similar inspection provisions, as they allow
inspectors to simply verify that the product is on site, rather than
actually growing. (This is of course acceptable for certain storable
products, which farmers might legitimately keep on site, but it fails to
directly verify that the products were grown on site.) The required
inspections also do not confirm produce within each growing season. In
addition to the substantive limitations of these annual site visits,
California lacks adequate numbers of inspectors. 127
Sanctions under the certified program are also similar to those
issued by markets that run their own programs in that they increase in
severity with repetition and seriousness. The sanctions are somewhat
more serious, however, in that they involve defined civil penalties in
addition to suspensions. “Serious . . . repeat or intentional violations”
receive a civil penalty between $401 and $1,000, “moderate” repeat
violations receive $151–$400 penalties, and “minor” procedural
violations are subject to $50–$150 penalties.128 Sellers charged with
violating the rules are entitled to written notice and may request a
hearing at which the sellers may present their own evidence.129 Sellers
are also entitled to make written appeals to the Secretary of Food and
Agriculture.130
Connecticut has a similar state certification program through which
the Connecticut Department of Agriculture Certifies certain markets as
selling only locally-grown produce.131 Farmers participating in certified
124

Id. § 47020(b) (Westlaw).
Id. § 47005.2 (Westlaw).
126 Id. § 47005.3 (Westlaw).
127 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 59 (noting requests by “farmers, market
managers[,] and consumers” for enhanced enforcement).
128 § 47025(b) (Westlaw) (defining “serious” as “repeat or intentional violations”,
“moderate” as “repeat violations or violations that are not intentional,” and “minor” as
“violations that are procedural in nature”).
129 Id. § 47025(c) (Westlaw).
130 Id. § 47025(d) (Westlaw).
131 See Market Agreement, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of
Understanding (2012), available at http://www.ct.gov/doag/lib/doag/marketing_files/2012_
fm_mou_fillable.pdf (showing a memorandum of understanding form through which the
state recognizes the market as offering Connecticut farm products “with a traceable point
of origin within Connecticut”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-6r (Westlaw through
2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.) (defining certified farmers’ markets).
125
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markets must provide a crop plan to the Department describing total
acres on the farm, “[t]otal [a]cres [c]ultivated,” and specific numbers of
acres, rows per foot, greenhouse square feet, or number of trees for
various types of produce grown.132 The head of the farmers’ market
certification program reports that farms new to certified markets are
inspected but that re-certifications are done only every three years, and
typically without visits.133 “The Commissioner of Agriculture may impose
civil penalties for” violations of the certification requirement up to a
maximum of $2,500 for each violation.134
Mississippi offers a voluntary certification of markets by the
Missisissippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce.135 To qualify, at
least half of the products at the market must be grown by the grower or
a representative in Mississippi, and the grower or a representative must
be present at the market.136 The state provides that it may deny a
market’s application or revoke certification for failure to meet market
criteria.137 The state does not, however, appear to have formal rules
regarding inspection to verify that fifty percent of products are local or
associated sanctions for fraud. On the market certification application,
the state asks the market to identify “the process by which your
growers/vendors are certified to sell at your market,” with options of
“[o]n-site inspection,” “[t]elephone verification,” “[w]ritten confirmation,”
and “[o]ther.”138 Certification of crop lists by agricultural extension
agents is another fraud prevention strategy. The Hernando, Mississippi
Farmers Market, discussed above, requires that the crop list affidavit be

132 CONN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BUREAU OF AGRIC. DEV. & RES. PRES., 2012–2014 CROP
PLAN (2011), available at http://www.ct.gov/doag/lib/doag/marketing_files/2012-2014_-_
crop_plan_fillable_.pdf.
133 Spiegel, supra note 65.
134 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7 (Westlaw through 2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.).
135 02-001-212 MISS. CODE R. § 100 (LEXIS through Jan. 3, 2014); Mississippi
Certified Farmers Markets Program, MISS. DEP’T AGRIC. & COM., http://www.mdac.state.
ms.us/departments/ms_farmers_market/certified-markets.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
136 § 102 (LEXIS); see also MISS. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & COMMERCE, CERTIFIED FARMERS
MARKET PROGRAM REGULATIONS (2013) [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI CERTIFIED FARMERS
MARKET PROGRAM REGULATIONS], available at http://www.mdac.state.ms.us/departments/
ms_farmers_market/pdf/CFM_regs.pdf.
137 §§ 102, 104 (LEXIS); MISSISSIPPI CERTIFIED FARMERS MARKET PROGRAM
REGULATIONS, supra note 136.
138 Market Application, Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce,
Mississippi Certified Farmers Market Membership Application, available at
http://www.mdac.state.ms.us/departments/ms_farmers_market/pdf/CFM_app.pdf.
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signed by an agricultural extension agent, as do Washington, D.C.’s
FRESHFARM Markets.139
Consumer protection divisions are another potential option to
protect locavores against market fraud. In Texas, for example, the
Consumer Protection Division may seek a restraining order against
“causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship,
approval, or certification of goods or services.”140
Although a few states have taken steps toward certifying food
localism, most leave this responsibility to the markets themselves, in
some cases loosely regulating them as required by the federal Farmers’
Market Nutrition Program,141 in which consumers may use food
assistance funds to purchase local produce.
2. Federal Laws
The majority of responsibility for specifically defining and enforcing
localism falls to markets, or to local and state governments, but the
federal government initially drove the definition of “local” food and the
means of enforcing it. The WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program
(“FMNP”)142 provides federal funds specifically for purchases of “fresh,
nutritious, unprepared, locally grown fruits, vegetables and herbs for
human consumption.”143 It also directs state agencies, which administer
the program, to “consider locally grown to mean produce grown only
within State borders,” although a state may also “include areas in
neighboring States adjacent to its borders.” 144 To enforce the “locally
grown” mandate, the USDA requires states to create a system for
139 Hernando Market Application, supra note 88; FRESHFARM Market Rules, supra
note 81, at 13. The FRESHFARM market rules also allow for another “3rd party inspector
(i.e., USDA Organic, Food Alliance).” Id.
140 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46–47 (Westlaw through 2013 3d Called
Sess.).
141 7 C.F.R. § 248.4 (2012).
142 There is also a Senior FMNP. Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sfmnp (last visited Mar. 20, 2014); see also Marne
Coit, Jumping on the Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the
Local Food Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 45, 63–66 (2008) (discussing the Farmers’
Market Nutrition Program and the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, created by
the Child Nutrition Act of 1996 and the Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of
1976, respectively); Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 273
(2011) (describing the extension of SNAP and WIC to farmers’ markets).
143 7 C.F.R. § 248.2 (defining “[e]ligible foods”); see also § 248.1 (stating one purpose
of the FMNP is “[t]o provide resources in the form of fresh, nutritious, unprepared foods
(fruits and vegetables) from farmers’ markets to women, infants, and children who are
nutritionally at risk”).
144 § 248.2.
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“identifying high risk farmers, farmers’ markets [if the state chooses to
certify markets], and roadside stands and ensuring on-site monitoring,
conducting further investigation, and sanctioning of” these businesses
“as appropriate.”145 As part of this system, states must “conduct annual,
on-site monitoring for at least 10 percent of farmers and 10 percent of
farmers’ markets” that participate in the program, with the highest risk
farmers and markets being included within this 10 percent.146
In states that certify markets, certification of a market as WIC
FMNP shows all consumers—not just those using federal assistance—
that the food at that market is local. To fulfill the federal requirements
of risk ranking, inspection, and sanctions, participating states must
write and follow state plans,147 and these plans often go beyond the
minimum federal requirements to define and enforce localness. As
Connecticut defines its WIC FMNP, “[t]he program shall supply
Connecticut-grown fresh produce to participants of the special
supplemental food program through the distribution of vouchers that are
redeemable only at designated Connecticut farmers’ markets.”148
Vendors at these markets must be certified by the state and as part of
certification must agree “to maintain only Connecticut-grown fresh
produce on display in a certified vendor stall.” 149 Vendors also must
submit “a completed application and crop plan to the department.”150
Most penalties outlined by the state are for vendors’ failure to comply
with requirements for properly submitting vouchers to the state. There
are no precertification requirements for farm inspections to verify that
produce was locally grown, but the refusal to allow an inspection when
the point of origin is in question is a violation.151
Massachusetts similarly provides that “[o]nly locally grown produce
from local farms is eligible” for the FMNP, although some FMNPcertified markets in the state are allowed to sell produce from border
states.152 Massachusetts also conducts some farm inspections under its
145

Id. § 248.10(e).
Id. § 248.10(e)(2).
147 Id. § 248.4; The plans contain a number of guidelines unrelated to verifying
localism; these include, for example, provisions for coupon reimbursement and price
posting. Id.
148 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-6h (Westlaw through 2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.).
149 Id. § 22-6l (Westlaw).
150 Id. (Westlaw).
151 Id. § 22-6n (Westlaw).
152 MASS. DEP’T OF AGRIC. RES., 2013 MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET COUPON
PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR FARMERS AND FARMERS’ MARKETS 2 (2013) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET GUIDELINES] (on file with the Regent University Law
Review).
146
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FMNP program, as do market managers. 153 Growers receiving more than
$1,000 in WIC farmers’ market coupons in a year are required to file
acreage reports (a “crop plan”) the following year, and they may only sell
food included on these lists. 154 Through this program, the state
suspended several farmers who sold non-local produce to FMNP
customers and has issued warnings.155
Other states have similar requirements. For farmers’ markets to
participate in the New York FMNP, they must submit a market
application showing that the market will be comprised of at least fifty
percent “bona fide New York State farmers . . . who grow and harvest [at
least fifty percent of their] fresh fruits and vegetables on land owned or
leased by them and who sell directly to consumers.” 156 To certify farmers,
markets are to use crop plans “with specific farm location(s) and a list of
the vegetables and/or fruits expected to be grown for sale at the
market.”157 Market managers and the state also may conduct farm
inspections to “verify Crop Plans,” and a failed inspection results in
immediate disqualification of the farmer from the FMNP program.158
Arizona’s FMNP agreement mandates a crop plan and that farmers at
approved farmers’ markets must “[b]e subject to both overt and covert
monitoring for compliance with AZ FMNP requirements,” including
“[m]arket visits, compliance buys and inspections of food production
areas.”159
Florida does not certify markets as FMNP-approved, but rather
identifies markets with participating farmers160 and certifies individual

153 Id. (“ALL certified farmers must agree to allow on-farm inspections by MDAR to
verify product sources and acreage under production.”); E-mail from David Webber,
Farmers’ Mkt. Program Coordinator, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, to
author, (Nov. 21, 2013, 15:29 EST) (on file with the Regent University Law Review)
(explaining that market managers also conduct inspections).
154 MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET GUIDELINES, supra note 152, at 2; Webber,
supra note 153.
155 Webber, supra note 153.
156 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF AGRIC. & MKTS., PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
FARMERS’ MARKETS (2013), available at http://www.agriculture.ny.gov/AP/agservices/fmnp/
FMNP_Farmers_Market_Package.pdf.
157 Id. (emphasis omitted).
158 Id. at 4.
159 ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., MANUAL FOR GROWERS AND FARMERS’ MARKET
MANAGERS 20 (2014), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/azwic/documents/local_agencies/
az-fmnp-growers-manual.pdf.
160 See Attachment E, FMNP Market Locations and WIC Sites Maps and
Proximities, provided by Carl Penn, Development Representative II, Fla. Dep’t of Agric. &
Consumer Servs. (Jan. 23, 2014) (on file with the Regent University Law Review).
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farmers161 to sell to FMNP coupon customers at markets around the
state. Under the state’s FMNP plan, state officials must “[c]onduct
compliance buys” to verify that farmers are selling only “eligible
products (i.e., locally grown Florida fresh fruits and vegetables)” to
FMNP customers.162 Farmers must also “allow on-farm visits by the local
county extensive agents to verify product sources and acreage under
production.”163
Although the WIC FMNP certification is a somewhat indirect
means to certifying compliance, as it only applies to certain participating
markets and farmers and contains many standards unrelated to
certifying localness, it shows that federal regulations for local food could
be implemented if there was sufficient demand for them. Just as the
USDA produced a regulatory definition of organic food and established a
certification program,164 the USDA could extend its FMNP definition of
local foods, or create a new one, and administer a local certification
program directly or through the states. As discussed in the following
section, generally-applicable consumer protection laws are another
avenue for addressing farmers’ market fraud, albeit one that does not
appear to be widely used.
3. Advantages and Barriers to Regulatory Enforcement
In some cases, producers are so concerned about fraud that they
have demanded more regulation or certification. Some, for example, have
requested that “a sting operation be conducted in order to ‘bust those
liars and cheats,’ ”165 which, according to at least one study, “is consistent
with the feeling reported by many vendors that specific regulations
should prevent . . . re-sellers from participating in markets.”166 Moving
the responsibility for ensuring localism from individual markets to a
local, state, or federal regulatory body would centralize expertise that is
currently dispersed. It would also provide a forum through which
consumers, farmers, and market managers could focus on and agree
161 See FLA. DEP’T AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., GROWER’S HANDBOOK 2 (2012)
[hereinafter GROWER’S HANDBOOK] (on file with the Regent University Law Review)
(describing farmer certification “by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services to participate in the program”).
162 State of Florida Farmers Market Nutrition Program, Memorandum of
Understanding between the Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. and the Fla. Dep’t of
Health 3 (Oct. 31, 2013) (on file with the Regent University Law Review).
163 GROWER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 161, at 2.
164 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to establish national
standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically
produced products . . . .”); see generally §§ 6501–23.
165 Miller et al., supra note 72, at 130–31.
166 Id. at 131.
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upon standards that would better ensure that local food was in fact local.
Further, it would provide economies of scale in administering standards;
inspections and enforcement are not likely to be a full-time job in all but
the biggest markets, and it would be more efficient for well-trained
inspectors to operate in more areas. As these inspectors gained
experience through incidents at a variety of farms and markets, they
would also better know which problems to look for, and the times and
types of inspections that were most effective.
There are, however, substantial obstacles to a regulatory proposal.
As with any effort to protect the values of a large and dispersed group of
stakeholders, it will be difficult to expand the regulatory state to address
fraudulent sales of local produce. In California, following the NBC
investigation that revealed relatively egregious fraud, a bill was
introduced to increase market operator fees in order to pay for better
inspections.167 The bill died in committee because “[a]ccording to
legislative insiders, the bill’s great many provisions and complex
language, including new penalties and mandates, did not work in its
favor.”168
Even if expanded regulatory oversight of localism were feasible, it is
not in all cases advisable. Market managers and farmers likely have the
most knowledge about the type of fraud that occurs and how to best
address it given the culture and norms within particular communities,
and uniform regulation threatens to drown these nuances. In many
cases, regulation therefore will not be needed: consumer discernment
and competition among markets to prove “localness” will often be
enough. Particularly where markets are small, farmers can police
themselves; indeed, they might not be able to afford anything else. 169
Relying on self-policing, however, sometimes leads to friction 170 that is
167 David Karp, Bill Targeting Cheaters at Farmers Markets is Put Off Another Year,
L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/features/food/dailydish/la-dd-billcheaters-farmers-markets-20130524,0,2483274.story.
168 Id.
169 See GARRY STEPHENSON ET AL., WHEN THINGS DON’T WORK: SOME INSIGHTS INTO
WHY FARMERS’ MARKETS CLOSE 9 (2006), available at http://smallfarms.oregonstate.edu/
sites/default/files/small-farms-tech-report/eesc_1073.pdf (noting “situations in which a high
level of effort is required to manage a market but the market administrative revenue is
insufficient for adequate salary” for a manager, and that this can occur for small markets).
170 RAMU GOVINDASAMY ET AL., FARMERS MARKETS: MANAGERS CHARACTERISTICS
AND FACTORS AFFECTING MARKET ORGANIZATION, at v, 8 (1998), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/36723/2/pa980898.pdf (noting that “rivalry among
vendors” sometimes “threatens to hinder the continuity and efficiency of these marketing
venues” and “that open hostility, negative remarks, false accusations about the origin of
the produce and problems with respect to the acceptance of food stamps or WIC vouchers
put a strain on the normal development of the markets’ activities”).
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best solved by a more formal and predictable regulatory regime. 171 As
one market manager notes, as markets get larger, enforcement becomes
more important: “You can’t be everywhere and you don’t know what’s
happening at that other end of the market now. You have to trust more,
have more structure, and have systems for enforcement of rules.”172 But
this is not to say that these rules must be imposed through regulation,
rather than by the markets themselves. With adequate competition for
localness, market managers will write and enforce rules themselves—as
they currently do: “A lot of regulation is put on managers” in modern
large markets.173
C. Criminal
In addition to expanding the administrative state to localism,
governments could, and sometimes do, criminally punish farmers’
market fraud. This approach, with its threat of more severe sanctions,
would likely deter more individuals from defrauding customers given the
same odds of detection. This section explores this somewhat extreme
approach to addressing the problem of dishonest produce sales.
1. Extension of Existing Laws to Market Fraud
Many state consumer protection laws cover agricultural fraud.
Virginia’s code provision labeled “Misrepresentation as to agricultural
products” provides that “[m]isrepresentation by advertising in the press
or by radio or by television, or misrepresentation by letter, statement,
mark representing grade, quality or condition, label or otherwise in
handling, selling, offering or exposing for sale any agricultural
commodities is hereby prohibited.”174 In Texas, “[a] person commits an
offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, [or]
recklessly” sells “an adulterated or mislabeled commodity.” 175
In states like California, where incidents of market fraud have been
highly publicized (and criticized), governments are beginning to use
criminal laws to enforce localism—in conjunction with regulatory
schemes.176 As introduced in Part II, after undercover state agents
noticed that a seller was selling produce he did not grow and that
171 FOORD, supra note 117, at 9 (noting that certification “eliminates a potential
friction point among vendors, who might suspect other vendors of selling products they
have purchased rather than products that they have produced”).
172 STEPHENSON ET AL., supra note 76, at 13.
173 Id. at 12.
174 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-225 (LEXIS through 2013 Spec. Sess. I).
175 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.42 (Westlaw through 2013 3d Called Sess.).
176 David Karp, Produce Inspectors Keep Farmers Markets Honest, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-farmers-market-20131227,0,2801845.story.

2014]

FRAUD IN THE MARKET

395

contained pesticides, the city attorney of San Diego charged the seller for
a violation of a section of the state’s Business and Professions Code. 177
The Code provides that it is unlawful for persons disposing of real or
personal property to “disseminate” information that “is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable
care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.”178 The defendant
received three years’ probation and “was ordered to violate no law; not to
sell or offer for sale produce at certified farmers markets in San Diego
County; and to pay a $1,000 fine.”179
2. Advantages and Barriers to Criminal Enforcement
Criminally punishing a farmer for selling produce he did not grow
may seem an extreme approach to market fraud, but it is a relatively
cheap one from the perspective of the state. An enforcement apparatus
already exists for crime, and police would simply have to investigate a
few additional incidents. And as shown by the California guilty plea, the
sanctions for criminal approaches to market fraud can involve penalties
higher than those imposed by a regulatory scheme, including jail time.
Prison terms for consumer fraud tend to be light, but states that were
serious about addressing market fraud could increase jail time. Criminal
penalties also generally create more stigma than their civil counterparts,
thus punishing past behavior by shaming individuals for bad acts and
further deterring future fraud by the stigmatized individuals.
A criminal approach, despite being cheap from an administrative
perspective and deterring greater amounts of fraud for the same amount
of enforcement, has disadvantages. Police are unlikely to prioritize food
fraud in all but the biggest cases or the safest towns. Prosecutors and
judges also may view criminal penalties for this type of fraud as
unusually harsh and will be hesitant to charge defendants, particularly
in light of other prosecutorial priorities. Criminal sanctions would likely
be quite effective at improving seller honesty if uniformly implemented
and strictly enforced, but relating to harshness, and the many other
problems that already burden the criminal justice system, make it a less
than perfect solution to farmers’ market fraud.
CONCLUSION
As farmers’ markets become more lucrative, fraud may become a
larger problem. Maintaining consumer confidence is critical, and the
177

Supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); supra note
64 and accompanying text (describing the charge and the guilty plea).
179 Turner, supra note 64.
178

396

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:367

honest farmers have the most to lose—one bad apple can spoil the whole
bunch.
For small markets and towns where farmers and consumers know
each other (and who is growing what), informal mechanisms may be
sufficient. For big markets and cities, if enough consumers are able to
discern the difference between local and fraudulent produce, markets
may be well advised to adopt more rigorous enforcement measures—and
to advertise it when they do. In the long run, if consumers demand
greater assurance that they are getting what they pay for, the market(s)
should respond. On the other hand, if there is insufficient competition
among local food outlets, or consumers are not able to adequately
distinguish between local and non-local foods, more government
intervention may be necessary. If so, direct government enforcement is
likely to be limited, but requiring more rigorous self-regulation in
certification processes may be a possibility. Given that most jurisdictions
are probably unlikely to create an adequate regulatory enforcement
regime, the markets themselves may be the best bet, with criminal
enforcement of chronic or widespread fraud. Requiring, perhaps,
unannounced farm visits, documentation of plantings and sales, and
ensuring adequate oversight of market supervisors would be a logical
place to start, and, as outlined above, the framework for such a
requirement already exists. But perhaps the most effective step would be
educating consumers: In the long run, if consumers learn to demand
greater assurance that their local avocado is what it says it is, fraud will
be less profitable.

